Using transaction level data of Dutch fixed income markets, we analyze the drivers of market liquidity between 2014 and 2016. Our results differ significantly across asset classes and during more volatile periods. Policy interventions, such as favourable treatment in liquidity regulation increases the liquidity of bonds. The effects of un-conventional monetary policy are mixed. On the whole it seems to reduce liquidity during normal times but supports it during more volatile periods. Market structure, i.e. the presence of High Frequency Traders (HFT), affects liquidity of sovereign but not of other bonds with reversed effects in more volatile periods. Bond specifics such as shorter maturity and higher ratings are consistently associated with higher liquidity.
Introduction
Bond markets play a crucial role in the conduct of monetary policy and achieving a stable and efficient financial system. Recently, there have been increasing concerns among policymakers regarding a possible shortage of liquidity in fixed income markets. International Monetary Fund (2015) , for instance, shows evidence that the level of market liquidity has remained stable in most asset classes, but warned that there may be risks to its resilience in periods of market stress. In line with this, Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012) find that liquidity in corporate bond markets significantly decreased since the onset of the subprime crisis but also that there is divergence according to asset quality. Financial Stability Board (2016), European Commission (2017), and Anderson et al. (2015) come to similar conclusions. In contrast, Aquilina and Suntheim (2016) find that UK bond markets appear to have become more liquid in recent years. The empirical evidence is thus mixed.
Focusing more on the drivers of market liquidity, CGFS (2014 CGFS ( ,2016 argue that dealer deleveraging, business model adjustments in response to the financial crisis and changes in market microstructure (especially the rise of algorithmic and high-frequency trading) have reduced trading and thus market liquidity. Exceptionally accommodative monetary policy may support market liquidity in the short term but hollow out the investor base in the long run. Among the regulatory drivers, the CGFS reports argue that the post-crisis overhaul of the Basel framework and initiatives like derivatives reform or structural bank regulation have changed the relative costs of banks' asset allocation and funding choices.
Due to data limitations, empirical research on the development of market liquidity and the drivers thereof is scarce. Using high quality transaction data from banks and other financial institutions in the Netherlands between 2014 and 2016, we add to the literature along two dimensions. 1 First, we attempt to shed light on the key drivers of market liquidity in Dutch bond markets. We specifically focus on the effects of new regulation (i.e., Liquidity Coverage Ratio), unconventional monetary policy and the presence of High Frequency Traders (HFT). We control for a set of bond characteristics and general volatility in financial markets. In line with Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012) , we use a variety of liquidity measures as well as a combination thereof. Second, we perform a case study to observe the relative presence of different types of investors in Dutch fixed income markets. 1 We use data reported under the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID).
2
Our results regarding the drivers of market liquidity significantly differ across asset classes and during stressed conditions. First, as for policy interventions, favourable treatment in liquidity regulation increases the liquidity of bonds. The effects of unconventional monetary policy are mixed. Very broadly speaking it seems to reduce liquidity during normal times but supports it during more volatile periods. Second, a market structure condition such as the presence of HFT affects liquidity of sovereign but not of other bonds. However, during stressed conditions the results are reversed. Finally, bond specific characteristics are important as well: Shorter maturity and higher ratings are consistently associated with higher liquidity while other bond specific characteristics are particularly important for non-financial bonds.
Our case study, focusing on the relative importance of banks compared to HFT, reveals that the inclusion of a particular type of bond in the central bank's purchase programmes leads to a relative increase in the presence of HFT. Regulation, such as the Liquidity Coverage Ratio, that makes certain bonds more attractive increases the share of those players covered by the regulation.
Our results suggest that unconventional monetary policy, regulation and the presence of new players all affect market liquidity. Those effects significantly differ across asset classes, which in turn depends on the design of the respective policy measure. Although not new, our results once again confirm that care needs to be taken when designing regulatory requirements.
Background on the possible drivers of market liquidity
The literature on the drivers of market liquidity is vast and providing even a condensed account of the state of play is beyond the scope of this paper. We refer to excellent overviews in, for instance, O'Hara (2003) and Menkveld (2017) . Here we focus on three drivers, namely, unconventional monetary policy, the liquidity coverage ratio and the role of high frequency traders. The Eurosystem allows the actual monthly purchase volumes under the programmes to reflect seasonal fluctuations in market liquidity. This means that the Eurosystem engages in moderate front-and back-loading of aggregate purchases in months with adequate market liquidity and allows the purchases to fall below the monthly average in periods of relatively low market activity, notably the summer and the immediate run-up to year-end. The frontand back-loading is not tied to a specific calendar but to the Eurosystem's judgment of market conditions. Additionally, the monthly purchase volumes of the different programmes under the Asset Purchase Programme (APP) will remain flexible to take into account prevailing market liquidity and activity at any time.
The ECB's purchase programmes are likely to be an important driver of market liquidity.
According to CGFS (2014 CGFS ( ,2016 , the measures have supported bond valuations, reduced volatility and supported bond issuance in many fixed income markets, which is likely to support market liquidity. There are various channels through which this happens. First, reliable interventions can reduce uncertainty and revive confidence. 3 Second, monetary policy 2 This section is largely based on public information provided by the ECB. 3 Also see Christensen and Gillan (2018) . 4 eases funding conditions, lowering the cost of liquidity provision by market participants.
Finally, by reducing the yields on sovereign bonds and other directly targeted assets, monetary policies can raise investor demand for less liquid instruments.
Recently several contributions have looked at the impact of Quantitative Easing or QE policies. Joyce and Tong (2012) look at the UK Gilt market while for the Euro area Albertazzi et al. (2018) , Altavilla et al. (2015) , Arrata and Nguyen (2017) , D'Amico and King (2013), Doran et al. (2013) , Fabian Eser and Bernd Schwaab (2016) , Galema and Lugo (2017) , and Koijen et al. (2017) have examined different angles of the effects of ECB's interventions. These papers look at how holding patterns are affected, whether there is a (permanent) price effect or spillover to other markets or the real economy. They find evidence of an effect of stock purchased on bond prices, while supplemental effects from flows remain generally small. Altavilla et al. (2015) notes that asset purchases also have a greater price impact in times of financial stress.
Accommodative monetary policy of this form might also entail challenges. Firstly, asset purchases reduces the availability of securities, reducing market liquidity by definition. Second, CGFS (2014 ,2016 argue that some market participants have raised concerns about increasing "one-sidedness" of markets, pointing to the risk of crowded trades and illiquidity if expectations were to change. 4
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
In response to the liquidity problems encountered by many banks during the last financial crisis, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) has drafted a new regulatory framework that specifies a short-term and a long-term liquidity requirement as key concepts to reinforce the resilience of banks against liquidity risks. The Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) is the short-term ratio that requires financial institutions to hold high quality liquid assets at least equal to their net cash outflows over a 30-day stress scenario. There are various classes of assets, namely Level 1 and 2. Level 1 assets include cash, central bank reserves and all assets that are either explicitly guaranteed or issued by highly-rated governments. in contrast to the US, the EU LCR also includes covered bonds as Level 1 assets, albeit with higher haircuts and concentration limits. Level 2 assets consist of lower-rated government bonds, certain types of securitisations and corporate bonds. In Europe, the LCR requirement came into effect in October 2015.
CGFS (2014) argues that while the LCR increased banks' resilience, it has increased funding costs and also made market making less attractive. Some market participants have also argued that the LCR requires banks to hold assets on their balance sheets instead of trading them, which negatively influences market making. On the other hand, making certain types of assets more attractive in regulation might also be liquidity increasing.
High Frequency Traders
High-frequency trading is a form of algorithmic trading utilized by High-Frequency Traders (HFT). HFT generally trade in instruments listed on regulated exchanges. The business model of HFT consists of executing a large volume of trades with a small profit margin and they are usually proprietary traders. As HFT use banking licenses, they are mandated to report under the MiFID regulation. This makes our data particularly relevant to research the impact of HFT since The Netherlands is home to some of the largest HFT world-wide, in particular Flow Traders, IMC, Optiver en All Options. Within high-frequency trading, two strategies can broadly be distinguished: arbitrage and market-making. In the arbitrage strategy small price differences between exchanges are exploited. In the market-making strategy, HFT quote prices continuously in order to probe market conditions, which can be used to their advantage. 5
There remains much debate with regards to HFT's net effect on market liquidity. Various studies argue that HFT increase the efficiency and liquidity of financial markets (cf Menkveld (2017) ). The rationale behind this is that (1) HFT arbitrage between instruments listed on different exchanges and this reduces fragmentation between exchanges; and (2) HFT increase the number of tradable buy and sell orders leading to more efficient pricing (i.e., lower bid-ask spreads). Others argue that HFT create an illusion of liquidity by increasing the number of quotes disproportionately relative to the actually tradable orders they place (because HFT often close their quotes before they are traded). Another commonly raised argument is that HFT are highly pro-cyclical. While they may decrease bid-ask spreads during normal times, they also withdraw relatively quickly during stress as, in contrast to for instance banks, they cannot warehouse assets. In this scenario, their absence amplifies already introduced market stress and thus further propagates the cycle.
Data

Data sources
We use data that is collected as part of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID). MiFID came into effect in November 2007 and replaced the Investment Services Directive (ISD). MiFID creates a legislative framework for the European Economic Area (EEA) and is designed to provide a transparent and efficient stock exchange trading and investments market. Importantly, the dataset used in this paper contains all transactions of exchange-traded (ET) instruments traded on a regulated market where a Dutch investment firms or credit institutions is either the buyer or the seller. It therefore does not include bonds traded over-the-counter (OTC). In bond markets, in stark contrast to equity markets, the OTC market is much bigger than the ET market.
In interpreting our results, we should be mindful of the scope of our dataset. Since we observe exchange traded instruments only, we should be cautious in extrapolating our results to include OTC instruments. Moreover, we only observe the exchange traded instruments of Dutch financial institutions. Notwithstanding these caveats, our data is sufficiently rich to still merit further analysis. First, our dataset is sufficiently large to shed light on the direction and magnitude of the underlying relationships. There is no a priori reason to assume that the ET and OTC markets would differ in this respect. Second, our dataset is in fact uniquely suitable to answer our second question with regards to the presence of the types of players as it provides a complete overview of Dutch financial players over time, mitigating many of the concerns stated earlier. Specifically, many of the world's most prominent HFT are present in our data.
The dataset spans January 2014 to November 2016. Each observation provides us with the International Securities Identification Number (ISIN), trading date and time, unit price, quantity, currency, a buy/sell indicator, the trading capacity to understand if the reporting firm is acting as a principal or agent and the reporting firm ID. We follow similar cleaning procedures as in Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012) . The appendix contains an overview of the MiFID variables, as well as an overview of the cleaning steps. We further complement the MiFID data with additional asset characteristics (matched on ISIN) from the ECB's Centralised Securities Database (CSDB) and Thomson Reuters Elite. This allows us to obtain data on the issuer sector (ESA-2010), rating, total outstanding amount and remaining maturity. Table 1 shows the summary statistics of our dataset. We can see that with almost 3 million transactions, government bonds are by far the most widely traded instrument. This is followed by financial bonds (900,000) while non-financial corporate bonds only show around 100,000 transactions in our sample period. On average, the values of the control variables are comparable across asset classes. However, there are also important differences.
Descriptive statistics
Unsurprisingly, government bonds show longer maturities and larger outstanding amounts.
Ratings and prices, on the other hand, are fairly comparable. Especially the involvement of HFT show large differences. With 90% of volume on average, HFT mainly trade government bonds while their involvement in other asset classes is very limited. In contrast, when the reporting institution acts on behalf of clients, this almost never concerns government bonds. This seems intuitive, as the majority of the purchase programme has been directed at sovereign debt.
In broad terms, financial bonds show the opposite pattern from government bonds. This is straightforward as the additional programme was mainly targeted at corporate bonds.
To get a better sense of the activities of HFT in our sample we plot the level of market volatility against the percentage participation of these new players in Figure 2 In sum, it appears that our three variables of interest -unconventional monetary policy, regulation and new players -have had an effect on transaction size and volumes, which are both important determinants of liquidity. However, there is widespread agreement that liquidity is very complex and that no single measure captures all these complexities. 6 Against this background and in line with Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012), we use a variety of liquidity measures. Specifically, we use the P rice Impact, Amihud, T urnover, P rice Impact over T urnover and Roll measure. We will discuss these measures in turn.
Methodology
Liquidity measures
To address the complexity issue around liquidity, our baseline dependent variable is based (2012), we define P rice Impact as daily average of absolute transaction returns:
Amihud (2002) is the most widely used measures and is defined as the ratio of the absolute return (price impact) during time t (e.g. day or week) of an asset divided by its volume over the same period. The ratio therefore represents the absolute price change per dollar of trading volume during a specific time period:
Both, Amihud and P rice Impact increase with decreasing liquidity and are therefore in fact illiquidity measures. The rationale is that for a liquid asset we do not expect to observe a large price movement and hence a low P rice Impact.
Our third measure captures the trading volume of a particular asset during a specific period. High trading volume and turnover imply high trading activity and the capability to liquidate portfolios within a short time period. T urnover is therefore positively associated with liquidity. The inverse of the turnover ratio can be interpreted as the average holding time of the asset, e.g. a turnover ratio of 0.5 for monthly data implies an average holding period of 2 months. In order to make this variable easily comparable to the other liquidity variables, we multiply with minus one.
Our fourth measures is the ratio of P rice Impact over T urnover while the fifth one follows Roll (1984) . Roll (1984) argues that under certain assumptions the bid-ask spread is equivalent to the square root of the negative covariance between two successive returns times two. The idea behind it is that a high bid-ask spread results in a high negative covariance between successive returns. The higher the bid-ask spread the more negative the covariance is. A high Roll measure means a high implied bid-ask spread and thus indicates an illiquid asset.
Model
To answer our question, we run two different sets of regressions. The first one aims at understanding the determinants of market liquidity, with a particular focus on monetary policy, regulation and new players. The second set of regressions aims at understanding the participation of HFTs in the market.
Our first regressions take the following form:
where Illiquidity t,i refers to the set of illiquidity measures as described in Section 4.1. In our baseline specification, we calculate all measures over a 1-week period while we also run sensitivity tests for day and month. This means that we compute weekly averages of the 13 different liquidity measures. An exception is turnover for which the total traded weekly amount is summed up (and then divided by the total outstanding amount The second set of regressions is defined as follows:
where the subscript t refers to a particular week and the subscript x refers to a particular security (identified by ISIN). This set-up allows us to look at the within security effect of the structural changes on relative presence of HFT versus banks. As previously, the dependent variable is defined as the percentage of trades within each ISIN each week are conducted by HFT. We use the liquidity indicator of turnover computed earlier as one of the regressors. The volatility variable is again defined as a dummy equaling one in the tail (i.e., the weeks with the highest 5% volatility). We have added a week dummy that equals one in the last week of each quarter in order to capture any potential window dressing effects. The results for financial and non-financial corporate bonds are qualitatively similar, leading us to describe only sovereign bonds versus these corporate bonds together.
14 5 Results
Drivers
The following section discusses our results with respect to government, financial and nonfinancial bonds. Overall, our results suggest that drivers vary significantly across asset classes and during stressed conditions. As for policy interventions, unconventional monetary policy is associated with lower liquidity in sovereign bond markets. The inclusion of nonfinancial corporate bonds in the purchase programme has not had an overall effect on the liquidity of these bonds. The introduction of the Liquidity Coverage Ratio, which would affect the relative attractiveness of different types of bonds, increases the liquidity in non-financial bonds and sovereign bonds while it is associated with declined liquidity in financial bonds. As for market structure, we find that higher activity of High-Frequency Traders (HFT) increases liquidity in sovereign bonds while having no effect on liquidity in financial and non-financial bonds.
First, the first two columns of Table 2 show our baseline results for financial bonds.
Overall, in line with expectations, we can see that shorter remaining time to maturity and larger outstanding amounts are associated with higher liquidity. Higher volatility does not have an effect on the liquidity of financial bonds. The monetary policy measures show mixed results. The first purchase programme is liquidity decreasing while the second one is liquidity increasing. The introduction of the LCR reduced liquidity in financial bonds and this effect is bigger during stressed conditions. This intuitively makes sense, as most financial bonds are not part of the LCR HQLA buffer and thus become relatively unattractive compared to for instance government bonds. A recurring methodological point in our results we note here, is that the magnitude and sign of the U M P and LCR variables are similar in magnitude and opposite in sign, effectively canceling each other out if taken together. We discuss the implications of this in the next Discussion section. The presence of HFT does not affect liquidity in financial bonds during normal times but does increase it during stressed conditions.
Next, we turn to Column 2, where interaction terms are added to observe how market liquidity of financial bonds is affected by our key variables in times of stress. We define stress here as those weeks that belong to the top 5% in terms of volatility as defined by the VIX index. In general, we see no statistically significant effects on any of our key variables. Note that the interaction effect between the LCR and V IX variable drops out of the equation due to the perfect multicollinearity between this variable and the interaction between U M P 2 and V IX. The reason for this is that these variables are closely related, as they are both defined as a dummy from a given date not so far apart and in the period between the inception of the LCR and the start of the increase of the QE programme there were no weeks with high volatility.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 shows our baseline and stressed results for non-financial corporate bonds, which are rather different from the other bonds. While Maturity is an important factor for the other types of bonds, it does not play a role for corporate bonds.
The Rating on the other hand is very important for the liquidity of these bonds. Also, in contrast to the other bond categories volatility has a significantly negative effect on non-financial bond liquidity, suggesting that these bonds are the first ones that stop trading when volatility increases. Interestingly, the purchase programmes do not have a statistically significant effect on the liquidity of these bonds. The introduction of the LCR is the only one of our key variables with a statistically significant effect on liquidity. Specifically, the introduction of the LCR increased the liquidity of corporate bonds by 0.05 standard deviation, which is also economically meaningful. Intuitively this seems plausible as many investment-grade rated corporate bonds are part of the LCR HQLA buffer. This is an interesting finding, as it suggests that inclusion in the HQLA actually led to these bonds becoming more liquid, as opposed to less liquid. The latter, reduced liquidity, could have resulted from banks warehousing these bonds rather than trading them prompted by the regulation. Similar to the case of financial bonds, there is no statistically significant effect of severe volatility on the effects of our key variables.
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 2 show our baseline results for sovereign bonds. Overall, we can see that shorter remaining time to maturity and larger issue sizes are associated with higher liquidity. Interestingly, higher ratings are not significantly related to liquidity in this bond category. A possible explanation for this is the fact that within the sovereign bond class, there is relatively little variation in terms of bonds (i.e., almost all sovereign bonds traded in our sample are rated A or higher). The variables measuring our key topics of interest -unconventional monetary policy, regulation and the presence of HFT -have different effects. While unconventional monetary policy is associated with lower liquidity, higher activity of HFTs raises liquidity. Interestingly, during stress, the impact of unconventional monetary policy is reversed while the presence of HFT is reduced.
When looking at the effects of unconventional monetary policy, an interesting picture emerges. The first round of QE purchases has had no particular effect on the liquidity in bond markets. In contrast, when the amount of purchases was increased to 80 EUR billion per month, there has been a significant impact on market liquidity. Specifically, holding the other factors constant, this programme coincides with a decrease in market liquidity of 0.15. In economic terms this is also significant, as it means that during this programme market liquidity decreased by 0.15 standard deviation. Second, looking at the impact of high-frequency trading, we can see that an increase in HFT of 1% leads to an increase of 0.0032 standard deviations in market liquidity. While this may seem small, recall that the standard deviation of HFT is around 22%. This means that a standard deviation increase in the presence of HFT leads to approximately a 0.07 standard deviation increase in liquidity which is also economically meaningful. Third, we can see that the introduction of the LCR coincides with a 0.08 standard deviation increase in liquidity. Again, following the same reason as before with the non-financial bonds, this indicates that inclusion in the LCR actually increased the liquidity of these bonds.
Next, we turn to times of stress again. In the case of government bonds, there is a significant impact of the interaction variables on our key variables. First, we observe that during times of significant stress the sign of U M P 2 reverses, meaning that in times of stress the impact of the unconventional monetary policy programme becomes positive (i.e., increases liquidity), relative to the situation of no unconventional policy. This result is also economically significant, as the programme then leads to an increase of liquidity of about 0.17 standard deviation. One interpretation of this result is that the purchases of the central banks provide a sort of 'minimum demand', through which there is always some liquidity available to willing participants even under stress. Conversely, the impact of stress situations on the impact of HFT on liquidity decreases (but not quite reverses). As a result a standard deviation increase in HFT only leads to approximately a 0.03 increase in liquidity in times of stress.
New players
We now take a closer look at any changes that have occurred in terms of market participation.
While in the previous section the assertion is that the changes in business models drive changes in liquidity, we now test whether the structural changes that have occurred drive the relative presence of market players. Table 4 Ranging from 0.5% to 1% are economically significant but small.
The introduction of the LCR -arguably making government bonds relatively more attractive for banks -led to a decrease of HFT activity in sovereign bond markets but increased their role in other markets. A likely explanation for this result is that during the introduction period, banks built up their liquidity buffers and were hence relatively more active in these markets. A similar explanation can be given for the days at the end of the quarter. Since those are reporting dates for banks, they are probably more active on markets, decreasing the relative activity of HFT. Periods of significant volatility captured by the VIX index do not appear to have an effect on the relative presence of players.
Sensitivity Analysis
To test the robustness of our results, we run several sensitivity tests. Firstly, to ensure that our results are not driven by the particular frequency (i.e., weekly) that we chose for our baseline regressions, we conducted the same analyses for daily and monthly periods. While there are some differences, the results are qualitatively similar. Secondly, we changed the definition of our key variables. Specifically, we included the unconventional monetary policy measures as continuous variables instead of dummy variables, we adjusted the introduction date of the LCR to reflect implementation lags and defined the activity of HFT per unique bond as opposed to on aggregate. Again, while these changes affect our results, the overall pattern is consistent across all specifications. Thirdly, we run all our regressions also with the individual liquidity measures as opposed to the PCA. The results of these alternative specifications can be found in the appendices.
Conclusion
Making use of a unique dataset with trade level information on Dutch fixed income markets, we take a comprehensive look at the liquidity of bonds traded by Dutch financial institutions. Second, we also analyze whether new regulation and unconventional monetary policy had an impact on the presence of HFT compared to banks. In combination with our other results, we conclude that the effects of various policy measures significantly differ based on their specific design. While this finding is not new, our results once again confirm that great care needs to be taken when designing policies as small differences can change their effects.
